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ABSTRACT 
Courts have consistently struggled to adopt a test that appropriately 
interprets the Copyright Act’s language protecting works of art 
incorporated into useful articles. The analysis that allows protections of 
these works of art is called “separability,” and it has been an ambiguous 
area of copyright law since its inception. In essence, this analysis gives 
copyright protection to a work of art incorporated into a useful article as 
long as the work of art is “separate” from the utilitarian aspects of the 
useful article. The Supreme Court was positioned to end the uncertainty 
surrounding the separability analysis in its recent decision, Star Athletica. 
But a survey of lower court decisions applying Star Athletica’s new test 
shows that it has significant shortcomings. The new analysis results in 
overprotection of designs incorporated into useful articles and lacks 
normative guidance. As a result, this Note first argues that Congress 
should amend the copyright statute. But, if the test remains unchanged, 
courts should proceed by analyzing these works of art in the following 
way: the more difficult it is to separate the work of art from the utilitarian 
aspects of the useful article, the “thinner” the copyright protection a court 
should give to that work of art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2017, the Supreme Court resolved a split amongst lower 
courts for the separability analysis.1 In Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 
the Court announced a new test that departed from the nine previous tests 
applied by lower courts.2 The separability analysis is used when copyright 
protection is sought for works of art incorporated into useful articles.3 It 
allows for certain works of art to gain copyright protection, despite the fact 
that those works are part of useful articles that are not themselves protected 
through copyright.4 For example, this test is particularly important because 
of its implications for the copyrights of designs on clothing.5 The fashion 
industry has consistently pushed for an expansion of copyrights in order 
to preserve and incentivize creativity6 with the practical goal of gaining 
greater protection to stop the frequent copying of fashion designs.7 Thus, 
the test announced by the Court may have far-reaching consequences for 
copyrights in certain industries, like the fashion industry, where designs 
are commonly incorporated into useful articles. 
 
 1. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 1005. 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 4. See id. (discussing the definitions of “useful articles” and “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works”). 
 5. Clothing falls under the definition of “useful article” because of its “intrinsic utilitarian 
function.” Id.; see also Amy L. Landers, The Anti-Economy of Fashion; An Openwork Approach to 
Intellectual Property Protection, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427, 428 (2014) 
(citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 40: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR PICTORIAL, 
GRAPHIC, AND SCULPTURAL WORKS (2015), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7K9B-ABNZ]). 
 6. David E. Shipley, All for Copyright Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
149, 165 (2018). But see Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2006). 
 7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1002 (2017) (No. 15-866) (“Justice Sotomayor: You’re killing . . . knock-offs with . . . copyright. You 
haven’t been able to do it with trademark law. You haven’t been able to do it with patent designs. We 
are now going to use copyright law to kill the . . . knockoff industry. I don’t know that that’s bad. I’m 
just saying.”). Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
809, 817 (2010); Landers, supra note 5, at 428. 
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This Note will consider the successes and struggles of lower courts 
in applying the new test subsequent to the decision in Star Athletica. In 
light of these cases, this Note argues that the new test announced in Star 
Athletica inadequately resolved the disparate tests by focusing on the 
abstract text of the Copyright Act. Lower courts’ application of this new, 
ambiguous standard reveals overprotection of useful articles based on a 
reliance on originality as a limit to protection. Moreover, courts have 
struggled with the departure from old tests, especially with the role of 
functionality in the analysis. 
Part I of this Note will conceptualize the various modern tests in the 
context and history of the Copyright Act. Part II of this Note will frame 
the abstract separability analysis in the context of the fashion industry, an 
industry replete with imitation. Part III of this Note will survey lower court 
applications of the new standard in order to locate the reasons for 
confusion and overprotection in application. Finally, Part IV argues that a 
solution to this problem should include one of two things: (1) an 
amendment to the separability section of the Copyright Act that utilizes all 
or some of the nine tests the lower courts used, which will aid in creating 
a clearer statutory standard or (2) a thin copyright protection for useful 
articles under the Star Athletica separability standard. 
I. SEPARABILITY IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT: HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Before jumping into the details of the separability analysis, it is 
important to consider the origins of separability. The separability analysis 
was prompted by a case decided twenty years prior to the 1976 Copyright 
Act, which provides the modern framework for copyright law.8 In Mazer 
v. Stein, the Court interpreted the 1909 Copyright Act to extend copyright 
protection to a sculpture of a dancer that was a part of a lamp.9 The Court 
held that the fact that the dancer was incorporated into the lamp did not 
change the ability of the sculptural work to obtain copyright protection, 
even though patent protection is supposed to sufficiently cover useful 
articles.10 The Court’s interpretation of the Act was supported by 
regulations of the Copyright Office.11 Subsequently, the Copyright Office 
 
 8. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 9. Id. at 213–15. 
 10. Id. at 217; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: US 
Copyright Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2016); Viva R. Moffat, The 
Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 611 (2014). 
 11. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212–14. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949) (extending protection to “works 
of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned”); Case Comment, Copyright Act of 1976—Useful Articles—Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. 
Varsity Brands, Inc., 131 HARV. L. REV. 363, 367 (2017) [hereinafter Harv. Case Comment].  
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codified the Mazer holding into a regulation,12 which became the basis of 
the separability analysis in the 1976 Copyright Act.13 
Mazer provides the paradigmatic example of where Congress 
intended to extend copyrights to works of art incorporated into useful 
articles. The work of art incorporated into the useful article in that case 
could be intuitively viewed as separate from the utilitarian aspects of the 
useful article. Comparing Mazer to other cases can be a useful tool to 
determine whether lower courts using Star Athletica’s separability 
analysis significantly departs from the kind of protection Congress 
intended to grant works of art incorporated into useful articles. 
While Mazer was the impetus of separability in the Copyright Act of 
1976, it is also essential to dig deeper into the words of the Act itself.14 
Congress enacted this Act pursuant to its Constitutional power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”15 While incentivizing creativity by granting 
copyrights is a priority of the Act, the Act also explicitly excludes useful 
articles from copyright protection.16 Useful articles are defined as 
“article[s] having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”17 The Act 
goes even further in refusing to protect these articles through a clarification 
of this definition: “An article that is normally a part of a useful article is 
considered a ‘useful article.’”18 The reason that there is a lack of copyright 
protection of useful articles is that patents, which grant protections to 
inventions,19 normally cover such articles.20 But patent protection is harder 
to obtain than copyright protection, and it does not last as long as copyright 
protection.21 
 
 12. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960). 
 13. Harv. Case Comment, supra note 11, at 367. 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
 17. Id. (defining a “useful article”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1860 
(2012). 
 20. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that 
copyright law was “never intended to nor would the Constitution permit them to protect monopolies 
on useful articles”); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 122 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006) (explaining that such patents 
for fashion design are impractical given the short timing of fashion). 
 21. Darren Hudson Hick, Conceptual Problems of Conceptual Separability and the Non-
Usefulness of the Useful Articles Distinction, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 37, 37 (2010). For an 
in-depth discussion of the differences between patent and copyright law, see Steve W. Ackerman, 
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Perhaps as a result of these differences, and with Mazer in mind, the 
Act also allows for protection of “‘[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works’ [that] include two-dimensional and three-dimensional” works of 
art.22 More particularly and most importantly here, while the Act does not 
protect parts of useful articles that serve a utilitarian function,23 it protects 
“the design of a useful article . . . only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”24 This is the “separability” analysis—
the section of the Act that codified the ability to protect specific parts of 
useful articles announced in Mazer. Even though the codification of Mazer 
in the statute seems relatively straightforward, the Act itself is not clear as 
to what it means to “be identified separately from” or exist “independently 
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”25 
The only clue regarding the application of separability based on the 
language of the Act is from the House Committee on the Judiciary. The 
Committee attempted to provide clarity by stating that a work of art could 
be protected if it could be either physically or conceptually separated from 
the useful article.26 Courts have interpreted physical separability to mean 
that the work of art can be “physically separated from the article by 
ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article 
completely intact.”27 If the work of art could not be physically separated, 
then it could still be protected as long as it could be imagined or visualized 
as separate from the useful article while leaving the useful article intact.28 
This is called “conceptual” separability.29 Without more guidance on the 
 
Note, Protection of the Design of Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies and Proposed Solutions, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1983). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ 
dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, 
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, 
the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.”). For more on the distinction between physical 
and conceptual separability, see generally Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing 
Debate Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 120 
(2008) and Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 
37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 339 (1990). 
 27. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1014 (2017) (citing U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(A) (3d ed. 2014)). 
 28. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(B) 
(3d ed. 2014). 
 29. Id. Justice Breyer gave helpful guidance on the distinction between physical and conceptual 
separability in his dissent in Star Athletica. 137 S. Ct. at 1031–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an 
example of physical separability, he used a lamp with a cat fixed on the round base of the lamp. Id. In 
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separability analysis, courts were tasked with creating meaningful 
standards that reflected Congress’s intentions in this section of the Act. 
But the abstract textual requirement and vague guidance for the analysis 
resulted in a variance of separability standards applied in the lower 
courts.30 Lower courts have used nine different tests in grappling with 
faithfully applying separability, some of which will be discussed in detail 
later in the article.31 
To summarize, when a party seeks copyright protection of a work of 
art incorporated into a useful article, the Act requires a court to (1) 
determine whether there is a valid copyright for the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work incorporated into the useful article32 and (2) utilize the 
separability analysis to establish whether the work of art can be 
sufficiently separated from the useful article.33 
But if separability is met, it only establishes that the author has 
ownership of a valid copyright in the work. If an author wants to enforce 
his or her copyright, there is also a two-part infringement component.34 
First, the author must show that the alleged infringer copied the author’s 
work, which requires showing that the infringing work copied the original 
elements of the work35 and evidence that the infringer actually copied the 
work.36 The second element is improper appropriation, and it asks whether 
the defendant’s copying was sufficient to constitute improper copying.37 
While different tests for improper appropriation have been articulated, at 
 
that case, the cat could be “physically separate from the lamp, as it could be easily removed while 
leaving both cat and lamp intact.” Id. at 1032. For an example of conceptual separability, Justice 
Breyer changes his hypothetical lamp to mirror the lamp in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Id. 
The cat sculpture is placed in the middle of the base of the lamp with wires running through it. Id. 
Because the cat sculpture and the lamp were “integrated into a single functional object,” the cat could 
not be physically removed from the lamp without destroying the lamp and the cat. Id. But because the 
cat can easily be imagined as separate from the lamp, the cat was conceptually separable from the 
lamp like the dance sculptures in Mazer. Id. 
 30. Jacqueline Lefebvre, Note, The Need for “Supreme” Clarity: Clothing, Copyright, and 
Conceptual Separability, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 179 (2016); Bill 
Donahue, In Cheerleader Case, Justices Could Clean Up Fashion “Mess,” LAW360 (Apr. 14, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/784087/in-cheerleader-case-justices-could-clean-up-fashion-
mess. 
 31. Kristy Diesner, Note, Useful Article or Creative Design: Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star 
Athletica, LLC, 27 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 96–97 (2016); Alexandra Spina, 
Case Comment, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 239, 244 n.41 
(2017) (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 
468, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 32. Kaitlin Chandler, Note, Bring It On: Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Redefines 
Separability One Uniform Design at a Time, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 225, 226 (2017). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 35. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 407–08 (4th ed. 2005). 
 36. Id. at 408–11. 
 37. Id. at 412. 
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the simplest level, the plaintiff “must show that the defendant copied a 
sufficient amount of the protectible elements of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work as to render the two works substantially similar.”38 A main question 
for a court regarding this element of a copyright claim, and a question 
integral to this Note, is the requisite level of similarity between the 
copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work that will be considered 
improper.39 In other words, depending on the kinds of works involved, a 
court may require more or less similarity between the works before 
concluding that a work is improperly infringing. 
II. STAR ATHLETICA: FASHION AND REASONING 
An example is helpful to conceptualize separability and its possible 
implications. Aside from announcing the new separability test, the Star 
Athletica case offers fashion as an example of why separability can be 
significant.40 Historically, because clothing is considered a useful article, 
Congress has refused to extend copyright protection to fashion designs on 
clothing.41 But Star Athletica put this question squarely before the 
Supreme Court and, through a test allowing designers to more easily 
obtain copyrights for fashion designs, gave the fashion industry some hope 
in realizing its goal of stopping the copying of designs.42 The case was 
about the copyrightability of chevron designs printed onto cheerleading 
uniforms.43 Because the designs were on useful articles, the Court was 
tasked with a separability analysis to determine the copyrightability of the 
designs.44 
As a result of the split in the lower courts, the Court took up Star 
Athletica to resolve the separability issue, and it announced a new test that 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 
207 (2012). 
 40. Julie Zerbo, Protecting Fashion Designs: Not Only “What?” but “Who?,” 6 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 595, 597–98 (2017). 
 41. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (U.S. Copyright Office Nov. 5, 
1991); Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets, 
39 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 163–64 (2010). 
 42. See Helene M. Freeman, A Big Cheer for Cheerleader Uniforms, FASHION INDUSTRY L. 
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), https://fashionindustrylaw.com/2017/03/22/a-big-cheer-for-cheerleader-
uniforms/ [https://perma.cc/T9T9-73CG]; Michael Madison, Two Cheers for Copyright, 
MADISONIAN (Mar. 27, 2017), http://madisonian.net/2017/03/27/two-cheers-for-copyright/ 
[https://perma.cc/BA7U-8L7S]; Steff Yotka, What the Supreme Court’s First Ruling on Fashion 
Copyrights Means for the Runway, VOGUE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.vogue.com/article/supreme-
court-star-athletica-varsity-brands-ruling-fashion-industry [https://perma.cc/B328-EMP5]. 
 43. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017). 
 44. Id. at 1004–05. 
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ended the debate as to which of the nine separability tests the lower courts 
should use.45 The Court created its own test: 
We hold that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article 
is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be 
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from 
the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other 
tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from 
the useful article into which it is incorporated.46 
The Court, applying its new test for separability—which closely 
followed the text of the Copyright Act—held that the chevron designs (1) 
could be imagined separately from the cheerleading uniforms and (2) 
could have qualified as a protectable work when imagined separately from 
the design.47 
In describing its analysis, the Court noted that “[t]he first 
requirement—separate identification—is not onerous” because one “need 
only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or three-
dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
qualities.”48 By choosing to focus on imagining the work of art separated 
from the useful article, the Court chose “conceptual” separability as the 
standard and explicitly eliminated the previous distinction between 
“physical” and “conceptual” separability announced by the House 
Committee on the Judiciary.49 
The Court went on to comment that “[t]he independent-existence 
requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy,”50 reasoning that this 
second requirement means that “the feature must be able to exist as its own 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart from the 
useful article.”51 The Court highlighted that this requirement in itself 
provided a sufficient analytical tool for determining whether the work of 
art served a functional purpose in the useful article: “If the feature is not 
capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once 
separated from the useful article, then it was . . . one of its utilitarian 
aspects” that was not protectable under the Act.52 
 
 45. Id. at 1007. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1010. 
 49. Id. at 1014 (“[W]e necessarily abandon the distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’ 
separability, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on the Copyright Act’s 
legislative history.”). 
 50. Id. at 1010. 
 51. Id. at 1005. 
 52. Id. at 1010. 
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This reasoning appears to disregard prior separability tests that more 
carefully analyzed whether the work of art performed a utilitarian function. 
More specifically, the Court explicitly clarified that it did not consider 
“any aspects of the useful article that remain after the imaginary 
extraction[,]” and it instead focused on the work of art separated from the 
article.53 This reasoning eliminated the need to analyze the functionality 
of the useful article after the design was removed, which was one notable 
test that some circuits previously adopted.54 The Court also unequivocally 
rejected two other tests previously used by lower courts: “(1) ‘[W]hether 
the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic 
judgment exercised independently of functional influence[;]’ and (2) 
whether ‘there is [a] substantial likelihood that the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural feature would still be marketable to some significant segment 
of the community without its utilitarian function[.]’”55 The Court rejected 
these tests because neither of them were rooted in the statute.56 
Since Star Athletica was decided, lower courts have focused on the 
Court’s example of a tangible medium in which the chevron designs could 
exist when imagined separately from the useful article: “a painter’s 
canvas.”57 While Justice Thomas worked hard to explain that this is an 
acceptable way to think about separability, the dissent was skeptical that 
this would merely create “pictures of cheerleader uniforms.”58 
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s interpretation won out; the test for 
separability is now rooted in the abstract language of the Copyright Act. 
III. LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS 
After Star Athletica, only a handful of cases have applied the new 
test in depth. Three general categories of cases emerge from a survey of 
these lower court decisions: (1) cases with facts that lend themselves to 
intuitive separability; (2) cases that result in overprotection of useful 
articles due to a reliance on originality as a limiting factor; and (3) cases 
struggling with the role of functionality in the new separability test. 
A. Intuitive Separability 
Some cases have provided notably easy separability analyses after 
Star Athletica because of their facts. In these cases, courts can intuitively 
 
 53. Id. at 1013. 
 54. Id. at 1014 (“But the statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning 
useful article at all, much less an equally useful one.”). 
 55. Id. at 1015 (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 34–35). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1012. For an example of this approach, see Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., 
Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting). 
 58. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1030–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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separate certain pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements from useful 
articles that are worthy of copyright protection. These cases had little 
difficulty in applying the separability analysis, so it is helpful to see where 
Star Athletica has been applied to contextualize the analytical problems in 
other cases. 
For example, in Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., the plaintiff 
brought a copyright infringement suit for the copying of its “Sparrow 
Clips,” comprised of a sparrow figure placed on a clothespin.59 In 
determining whether the sparrow figure was copyrightable, the court 
initially and very easily held that, regarding the first separability 
requirement, the bird could be imagined as a three-dimensional work of 
art separate from the clothespin.60 The court proceeded to hold that the bird 
would be a copyrightable sculptural work of art when separated from the 
clothespin and placed into another tangible medium.61 In its reasoning for 
this second requirement, the court noted that the sparrow figure was not 
“useful” merely because it could be used in insignificant or trivial useful 
ways once removed from the useful article (like hanging the bird from its 
beak or using the bird as a door stop).62 Instead, the sparrow on the 
clothespin had to have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely 
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information” to be 
useful and thus not protectable.63 
In another case, Triangl Group Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui District 
Lingzhi Garment Co., the plaintiff asserted copyrights in their distinctive 
swimsuit line with a black trim in a “T” shape.64 The court directly 
analogized these facts to Star Athletica and stated that the “black trim and 
T-shape” of the swimsuit could be imagined separately from clothing and 
could exist as their own works of art in another tangible medium.65 
Both of these cases give good examples of the straightforward 
application of Star Athletica when there is an identifiable work of art that 
is intuitively separable from a useful article. In Design Ideas, a three-
dimensional sparrow on a clothespin is relatively easy to imagine as 
separate from the clothespin and existing as its own sculptural work in 
another medium.66 These facts are very similar to Mazer in that the bird, 
 
 59. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 
20, 2017). 
 60. Id. at *2. 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at *1 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). 
 64. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., No. 16 Civ. 1498 
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
 65. Id. at *8 
 66. Design Ideas, Ltd., 2017 WL 2662473, at *2. 
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like the sculpture of a dancer on the lamp, was separable from the 
clothespin and naturally viewed as an artistic statue in its own right, rather 
than being a utilitarian part of the clothespin.67 The Triangl Group case 
offered a similarly easy separability analysis because it concerned shapes 
and designs on a commonly used fashion item, which were plainly 
separable under Star Athletica’s holding.68 
B. Overprotection and Originality 
Other cases have useful articles and designs that stray further from 
cases like Mazer and Star Athletica, which make the separability analysis 
much more demanding. These cases start to expose some of the 
complications and the lack of guidance from Star Athletica’s analysis. In 
one category of challenges, courts only rely on originality to limit broad 
applications of the new separability analysis. A work must be original in 
order to be eligible for copyright protection.69 Originality requires that 
both authorship and creativity be manifested in the work in question,70 but 
the amount of creativity necessary is considered “extremely low.”71 While 
courts are not overtly struggling with overprotection, using originality as 
a limiting factor once separability is met leads to overprotection of useful 
articles. The following cases provide some examples. 
In one case, Silvertop Associates, Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, 
Inc., the plaintiff asserted copyrights to the combination of designs 
incorporated into a banana suit.72 In granting a preliminary injunction, the 
district court held that almost every feature of the banana suit was probably 
protected except for the arm holes.73 According to the court, the cutout 
holes of the suit were merely an unprotectable utilitarian part of the suit 
because “[t]hey do not contribute to the Banana Costume’s aesthetic 
except to produce it in a wearable form.”74 However, almost the rest of the 
entire suit was protected under the separability analysis.75 The court’s 
framing of this analysis is significant to its outcome: “The Court must view 
the Banana Costume as a whole, as opposed to inspecting the individual 
 
 67. Id. at *2–3. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 68. Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *8. 
 69. Katherine L. McDaniel & James Juo, A Quantum of Originality in Copyright, 8 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP 169, 169 (2009). 
 70. David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other 
Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 92 (2007). 
 71. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 72. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (D.N.J. 2018), aff'd, 
931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 73. Id. at 764. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 764–65. 
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components that come together to create the Banana Costume.”76 The 
court went on to state that the banana suit’s features comprised as a whole, 
many of which are suspect as utilitarian parts of any costume,77 could be 
“identified separately from and can exist independently from the utilitarian 
aspect of the article.”78 Perhaps most interestingly, the court stated that “if 
these features were separated from the costume itself and applied on a 
painter’s canvas, it would qualify as a two-dimensional work of art.”79 
Relying heavily on a “painter’s canvas” as a primary means of legal 
analysis, the court held that the compilation of the banana suit’s colors, 
shapes, and textures could together be protected because the “imaginative 
spark” of the unique combination of its parts provided the requisite level 
of creativity for originality.80 The court came to this conclusion despite the 
fact that the banana suit depicted a natural object and was “unlikely to end 
up in the Philadelphia Museum of Art.”81 
This decision was recently affirmed by the Third Circuit.82 The Third 
Circuit agreed that the Banana Costume contained artistic features 
(“colors, lines, shape, and length”) that were separable and capable of 
existing independently of the useful article.83 The court also agreed that 
the costume’s holes were not protectable because they were a utilitarian 
part of the costume.84 The Third Circuit explained that it could “imagine 
the banana apart from the costume as an original sculpture” and that the 
“sculpted banana, once split from the costume, is not intrinsically 
utilitarian and does not merely replicate the costume.”85 Moreover, the 
court confirmed that Star Athletica allowed the artistic features of the 
 
 76. Id. at 764. 
 77. The court identified the following as protectable: 
a) the overall length of the costume, b) the overall shape of the design in terms of curvature, 
c) the length of the shape both above and below the torso of the wearer, d) the shape, size, 
and jet black color of both ends, e) the location of the head and arm cutouts which dictate 
how the costume drapes on and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to the mere existence 
of the cutout holes), f) the soft, smooth, almost shiny look and feel of the chosen synthetic 
fabric, g) the parallel lines which mimic the ridges on a banana in three-dimensional form, 
and h) the bright shade of a golden yellow and uniform color that appears distinct from the 
more muted and inconsistent tones of a natural banana. 
Id. at 764–65. 
 78. Id. at 764. 
 79. Id. at 765. 
 80. Id. It is also worth noting that the court contrasted the banana costume with the iconic 
cheerleading outfit in Star Athletica. While the chevron designs on the outfit were protectable, the 
court noted that the cheerleading uniform itself would not be protectable because it was an iconic and 
common outfit that necessitated no level of originality on its own. Id. 
 81. Id. at 765. 
 82. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 931 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 83. Id. at 221. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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costume to be analyzed in combination.86 The court again rejected the 
argument that the banana costume was unoriginal because the banana suit 
depicted a natural object.87 It emphasized that the argument “seeks to raise 
the originality requirement’s very low bar”88 and held that “the depiction 
of the natural object has a minimal level of creativity” to be 
copyrightable.89 Last, the court rejected the infringer’s analogy to another 
case in which the court held that a costume was not original because the 
costume was merely a pile of fabric when imagined separately from the 
wearer.90 The court underscored that Star Athletica no longer permitted 
such an approach because it required the expressive features to be 
imagined and fixed in a “tangible medium.”91 Thus, while the court did 
not specifically use the “painter’s canvas” in its analysis, it confirmed that 
the district court’s use of that mode of analysis was proper 
after Star Athletica. 
In another case, Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., the plaintiff 
sued for the copyrights to the designs of hookah water containers.92 The 
court concluded that plaintiffs failed to identify the separate parts of the 
hookah containers that could be the predicate for the Star Athletica 
analysis.93 The issue was that the plaintiff sought protection of the way the 
shapes were combined to form the entire container.94 The court explained 
that “[w]hen an entity seeks protection for the arrangement of all the parts 
of an article, combined in the manner necessary to create the article, it is 
effectively seeking protection for the article as a whole.”95 Because such 
comprehensive protection of useful articles is not permissible, the court 
held that the plaintiff did not point to artistic features of the containers that 
were separable from the usefulness of the article itself.96 The court 
attempted to identify individual or subsets of shapes that could be works 
of art separated from the container.97 However, the court highlighted that 
the container was a combination of common geometric shapes that were 
 
 86. The court noted that Star Athletica took into account “the arrangement of colors, shapes, 
stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the cheerleading uniforms.” Id. (quoting Star Athletica, L.L.C. 
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 222. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citing Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012). 
 92. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. See id. at *3. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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not sufficiently unique to be passable as original sculptural works.98 
Nevertheless, the court qualified that some unique combinations of 
geometric shapes could be sufficiently original after Star Athletica.99 The 
court, however, concluded that “the water container at issue here is no 
Noguchi Table.”100 
In Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc., the plaintiff asserted 
copyrights to certain arrangements of polygons in 3D digital car models 
used in the defendant’s video games.101 The plaintiff claimed that its 
arrangements of the polygons were copyrightable because they were 
sufficiently original and because they could be separated from the cars as 
they appeared on the screen.102 The court assumed that the polygon 
arrangements were separable from the cars because the defendant did not 
contest that fact.103 Because separability was met, the court was left only 
to consider whether these arrangements possessed the required level of 
originality.104 Unlike Inhale, where the polygons did not meet the required 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
100. Id. A Noguchi table is a modern table that creatively utilizes shapes in its design. The 
court used the table’s creative design as an example of how a configuration of shapes can possess the 
requisite level of originality and how the shapes of the water container did not remotely represent 
such creativity. The court included a picture of a Noguchi table at this part of the opinion, and below 
appears another example:  
 
Noguchi Table, DESIGN WITHIN REACH, https://www.dwr.com/living-accent-coffee-tables/noguchi-
table/6115.html?lang=en_US [https://perma.cc/KP5K-KTYE]. 
 101. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at *5. 
 104. See id. 
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level of originality, the court held that the decisions made by artists 
working for the plaintiff on where to put the large amount of polygons 
based on millions of combinations possessed the minimal, requisite degree 
of creativity.105 
All three of these examples, in one way or another, show the 
extension of the copyrightability of useful articles after Star Athletica 
because originality appears as the only limiting factor to a broad 
separability analysis. In Silvertop, the court decided that almost an entire 
banana suit was probably protected because the suit was comprised of a 
unique combination of various parts.106 The court was allowed the freedom 
to deem those combinations as original after it applied the new and less 
stringent separability analysis.107 Both the district court and the Third 
Circuit were able to conclude that the banana suit was separable because 
it could exist in another tangible medium.108 This arguably confirms the 
dissent’s worry in Star Athletica that the new separability analysis 
would allow for copyrightability by creating “pictures” of the work of 
art in question.109 
Moreover, the overprotection resulting from this new analysis is 
apparent when looking at how far Silvertop takes us from Mazer. As 
previously discussed, the dancer incorporated into the lamp in Mazer is 
relatively easy to see as a piece of art separable from a lamp as a useful 
article.110 However, in Silvertop, it is more difficult to see how a banana 
suit’s “artistic” shape and length are separable from the whole suit as a 
useful article.111 Thus, because of its focus on the originality of the 
combination of artistic parts in the suit, Silvertop shows that the new 
analysis may provide copyright protection in cases where it is not clear 
whether the artistic parts of the useful article are separable from the 
article’s usefulness. 
The issue of originality as a limiting factor is also more clearly shown 
in a comparison between Inhale and Glass Egg. The court in Inhale, while 
noting that it was an easy case, drew the line between what was not a 
protectable arrangement of geometrical figures—the hookah containers—
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 765 (D.N.J. 2018), 
aff’d, 931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 107. For cases before Star Athletica that protected costumes, see Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. 
Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990) and Nat’l Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, 
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
 108. Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 765; Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., 
Inc., 931 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 109. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1030–31 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 110. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202, 212–14 (1954). 
 111. See Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65. 
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and a protectable arrangement that was—a Noguchi table—based on the 
originality of the composition rather than on the separability of such 
arrangements.112 Although originality limited the copyrights of the 
common polygon hookah containers in Inhale,113 there was no such limit 
to the more complex car models in Glass Egg.114 Originality appears to be 
the only difference in the result between the two cases. If originality is the 
only limit to the new separability analysis, then it is likely correct that the 
new analysis will extend protection to artistic parts of useful articles 
beyond what Congress intended.115 Originality is a low bar in copyrights, 
and it is not an effective limiting factor to a broadened separability 
analysis.116 It seems that the copyright community has already noted the 
possibility of overprotection of designs on useful articles as there has been 
a notable increase in copyright litigation after Star Athletica.117 
C. Functionality 
In another category of challenges, courts struggle with the role of 
functionality in determining whether the work of art can exist separately 
from the useful article.118 Notably, the Court in Star Athletica rejected both 
a meaningful analysis of the functionality of the useful article after the 
expressive feature is separated, as well as whether the design of the work 
of art reflected any functional influence.119 Both of these tests were 
previously used by courts for the separability analysis.120 The role of 
functionality in the separability analysis has caused some tension in the 
following cases. 
 
 112. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 
 115. Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 709, 712–14 (2018). 
 116. See generally McDaniel & Juo, supra note 69; Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451 (2009). 
 117. See McDaniel & Juo, supra note 69. See, e.g., Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress 
Suit Against Forever 21 Over Rihanna Shoes, FASHION L. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.thefashion 
law.com/home/puma-files-design-patent-copyright-trade-dress-suit-against-forever-21-over-rihanna-
footwear [https://perma.cc/M8KB-BB6F] [hereinafter Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress 
Suit]. 
 118. For an in-depth discussion of the confusion of the role of functionality in the separability 
analysis in Star Athletica, see generally Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Forgetting 
Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2017); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Shoveling a Path After Star 
Athletica, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1216, 1224–31 (2019). 
 119. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013, 1015 (2017). 
 120. Larry C. Russ & Nathan D. Meyer, Fashion Forward: The Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands 
Decision Overturned Copyright Office Practices Going Back Half a Century, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2017, 
at 20, 23–24. 
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In Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., the plaintiff sued to enforce its 
copyrights to a teardrop light set that had ornamental features, including 
“molded, decorative tear shaped covered lights with a wire frame over the 
covers.”121 With regard to the first requirement of separability, the court 
held that the decorative molding of the lights could be identified separately 
from the utilitarian use of the light set.122 The court reasoned that the 
second requirement for separability was also met because the decorative 
covers were artistic, sculptural works that could be removed from the light 
set and stand apart from the functionality of the light set.123 This analysis 
seems straightforward. But the court also clarified that, even though the 
light covers served a useful purpose by creating less glare, it was irrelevant 
whether the useful article was equally functional once the separated part 
was removed after Star Athletica.124 
In Ross v. Apple, Inc., the plaintiff asserted copyrights of his drawing 
that he claimed Apple had stolen from him through the “non-functional 
aesthetic look and feel” of the drawings.125 The court, however, disagreed 
and stated that the parts of the drawing were not separable from “the idea 
of a handheld electronic reading device.”126 Thus, the court held that none 
of the elements of the drawing could be perceived as a work of art that was 
separate from the usefulness of the device itself.127 Instead, the court stated 
that these were “necessary parts of [the device,]”128 which is a nod toward 
a previous separability test that emphasized the functionality of the work 
of art for the useful article.129 It is unclear whether Star Athletica 
abandoned that test specifically, but this court does appear to rely on it in 
part when applying the new test. 
After Star Athletica, the Court instructed that functionality (i.e., the 
utilitarian aspects of the useful article) was considered only when deciding 
whether the work of art could “exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.”130 Thus, the focus of this analysis is simply on the ability of 
the work of art to exist in another tangible medium. The Court circularly 
concluded that, as long as the work of art could exist separately, then it 
 
 121. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 2017). 
 122. Id. at *6. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at n.2. 
 125. Ross v. Apple, Inc., 741 F. App’x 733, 734 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 126. Id. at 737. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. This separability test was called “the objectively necessary approach, which provides that 
‘if the artistic features of the design are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of 
the article,’ then the article is conceptually separable.” Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41. 
 130. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017). 
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was not a utilitarian part of the useful article.131 But this analysis arguably 
confuses courts because it is unclear what analytical tools are to be used 
in deciding whether the work of art can exist apart from the useful article’s 
utilitarian aspects. In other words, by rejecting previous tests relating to 
functionality, Star Athletica left courts to grapple with how to make 
principled distinctions between the work of art and the useful article’s 
functionality. 
These cases together shed light on how courts are responding to the 
role of functionality in the separability analysis after Star Athletica. In 
Jetmax, the court went out of its way to highlight the irrelevancy of the 
fact that the function of the light changed when the decorative piece was 
removed.132 That case is a signal that courts are struggling with the tests 
specifically rejected by Star Athletica that emphasize the functionality of 
the useful article. Ross further highlights this problem with Star Athletica’s 
reasoning. The court in that case was not willing to recognize copyright 
protection of the look and feel of a drawing of a handheld device because 
all parts of the drawing were necessary to the functionality of a handheld 
device.133 While that case concluded that the artistic part of the drawing 
could not be imagined separately from the useful article itself, it reveals 
that courts may still grapple with the functionality as a part of the 
separability analysis and even rely on previous tests in the analysis. This 
is not surprising given that separability is an exception to the general rule 
that useful articles, as functional objects, are not intended to be protected 
through copyright. Therefore, these two cases show that Star Athletica’s 
reasoning lacks guidance regarding the role that functionality plays in 
whether the expressive element is a utilitarian part of the useful article. 
IV. RESOLVING CONFUSION AND OVERPROTECTION 
A. Amend the Copyright Act 
Star Athletica’s new test has fundamental problems. Its ambiguity 
allows for overprotection of useful articles and, most importantly, it lacks 
the analytical structure that courts need for the already difficult 
separability analysis. Star Athletica rejected the tests applied by the lower 
courts that were not grounded in the text of the statute, especially those 
tests analyzing the functionality of the useful article after the expressive 
element was removed.134 However, a complete banishment of the previous 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017). 
 133. Ross, 741 F. App’x at 734. 
 134. See generally Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002. 
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tests is confusing, especially because it is unclear what role functionality, 
as an analytical tool, is supposed to play in copyright protection for useful 
articles. This confusion is reflected in challenges the lower courts have had 
integrating functionality into a separability analysis after Star Athletica. 
And Star Athletica’s new test offers no additional or useful guidance 
because it focused solely on the abstract language of the Copyright Act. 
An appropriate way to resolve these issues is to bring the prior tests 
back into the fold. Because the Court has already spoken through Star 
Athletica, a petition for Congress to change the analysis might be the next 
logical step. It is important to consider the incentives for Congress to 
amend the separability language if petitioned to do so. 
First, if Congress still intends to not grant broad copyright protection 
for fashion designs, it should consider changing this analysis. Clothing 
designs can be protected through design patents even when the design is 
not separable from the utility of clothing.135 However, the fashion industry 
has pushed for broadened copyright protection in its designs because 
design patents last only fifteen years136 and copyrights can last much 
longer.137 Congress has been hesitant to give broad copyright protection to 
fashion designs, and has declined to adopt broader protection on many 
occasions.138 But the broader separability analysis would allow for more 
copyrightable designs for fashion companies.139 If the Congressional 
intent of not allowing clothing designs to be copyrightable remains, Star 
Athletica’s broadened protection for these designs is a persuasive reason 
for Congress to amend the statute. 
Another significant reason for Congress to amend the Act is the 
possible national—and even international—market effect that a broad 
separability analysis could create. The separability analysis could have 
great market impacts for the clothing industry.140 Fashion companies are 
likely to bring more suits against alleged copiers after Star Athletica.141 
These suits would attempt to suppress the copying industry in fashion, 
 
 135. Id. at 1034–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (first citing 35 U.S.C §§ 71, 173 (2012); and then 
citing Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 48–51 (2013)). 
 136. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012). 
 137. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (e.g., the copyrights to work after 1978 of known authors last 
for the life of the authors, plus seventy years after their death). 
 138. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1034 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting various sources on 
this point and stating that “[c]ourts must respect those lines and not grant copyright protection where 
Congress has decided not to do so. And it is clear that Congress has not extended broad copyright 
protection to the fashion design industry”). 
 139. See id. at 1034–35. 
 140. Levi, supra note 115, at 709 (noting the possible downhill effects of fashion companies 
aggregating many copyrights to their designs). 
 141. See, e.g., Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress Suit, supra note 117. 
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where other companies appropriate distinguishable parts of the fashion 
designs to use in their clothing.142 The active attempt at destruction of the 
copying industry could produce disruption in this large market, which sells 
high-end designs at lower prices to more people.143 While the extent of 
these impacts is obviously unclear, the possibility of disruption in an 
industry that “in the United States alone encompasses nearly $370 billion 
in annual spending and 1.8 million jobs”144 should give an additional, 
compelling reason for Congress to amend the statute. To be clear, this Note 
does not support the copying industry; instead, I am merely identifying a 
real consequence of the separability analysis that provides a convincing 
reason for Congress to amend the statute. 
But the most important reason for Congress to amend the statute is 
because Star Athletica’s test lacks analytical structure. Prior to Star 
Athletica, many tests attempted to provide normative substance to 
separability to best effectuate Congress’s intent through the abstract 
separability language in the Copyright Act.145 These tests, while paying 
heed to the statutory language, went beyond the statute and looked to the 
history of separability as well as the broader policies of copyright for the 
best possible test.146 Star Athletica brought separability back to the abstract 
point from which courts were confused in the first place, resulting in the 
overprotection of useful articles’ functional elements—likely unintended 
by the original statute.147 Thus, it appears that Congress should intervene 
because courts are forced to again grapple with abstract statutory language 
without reliance on any old tests or outside policies for aid. 
If Congress were to amend the statute, it would not be working with 
a blank slate in terms of substance. Instead, Congress should find 
normative guidance through the lower court tests prior to Star Athletica. 
In particular, in light of the issues functionality has posed to court’s 
 
 142. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2009); Nia Porter, Are High-Fashion Copies Actually Legal?, RACKED 
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.racked.com/2016/8/18/12428004/fast-fashion-copy-sites-legal-knock-
off [https://perma.cc/Y54H-YPNZ]. For more on why designers want to stop the copying industry, see 
Eric Wilson, A Marriage of Economic Convenience, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/fashion/designer-retailer-union-remains-lucrative.html 
[https://perma.cc/SDY3-HUM3]. 
 143. Richard Boudreaux, In Italy, It’s Survival of the Fakest, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2000), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-oct-06-cl-32027-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZK8E-
U3U2]. 
 144. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE NEW ECONOMY OF FASHION 1 (2016), https://www.jec. 
senate.gov/public/_cache/files/01498736-4605-4715-a894-4a04f65b01fc/the-new-economy-of-
fashion——joint-economic-committee-final-lp-.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NUG-Z48J]). 
 145. Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1002; Levi, supra note 115, at 709. 
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analyses, the tests and cases speaking directly to functionality as a 
meaningful part of separability would be particularly useful.148 Courts are 
in need of a principled way to determine whether the work of art is a 
utilitarian aspect of the useful article. The previous tests provide Congress 
with a few options that go beyond the text of the statute as it is currently 
written to provide a workable analysis for such a determination.149 Adding 
functionality back into the analysis should also be augmented by the test 
rejected by Star Athletica that considered the marketability of the useful 
article to address any possible concerns of market impact noted above.150 
Congress will need to address these two items in particular if it decides to 
amend the statute, and it has a variety of options to provide the most clarity 
and guidance for courts in the separability analysis. A petition for such an 
amendment might be the last resort to clear up the ambiguity of the 
separability analysis, and the prior tests provide at least some legitimate 
launching point for the discussion. 
 
 148. These are the tests that involve some level of functionality within the separability analysis: 
(2) the primary-subsidiary approach, which states that conceptual separability exists “if the 
artistic features of the design are ‘primary’ to the ‘subsidiary utilitarian function,’” (quoting 
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)); (3) the 
objectively necessary approach, which provides that “if the artistic features of the design 
are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article,” then the 
article is conceptually separable . . . (5) the design-process approach, which provides for 
conceptual separability if the design elements reflect the “designer’s artistic judgment 
exercised independently of functional influences,” (quoting Brandir Int’l, Inc., v. Cascade 
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987)); (6) the stand-alone approach, which 
provides for conceptual separability if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] intact 
once the copyrightable material is separated,” (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene 
Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting)) . . . (8) Patry’s 
approach, which asks whether designs are “separable from the ‘utilitarian aspects’ of the 
article,” rather than the article itself, satisfying separability if the discernable PGS features 
are “capable of existing as intangible features independent of the utilitarian aspects of the 
useful article,” and are not “dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the 
useful article,” (quoting 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:146 (2015)); and (9) 
the subjective-objective approach, which determines separability by balancing the extent 
“to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns [and the 
extent] to which the design . . . is objectively dictated by [the article’s] utilitarian 
function,” (quoting Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate 
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 
141 (2008)). 
Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41. 
 149. Id. 
 150. This is the test that approaches separability with the market in mind: 
(7) the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which states that conceptual separability 
exists when, “even if the article ha[s] no utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some 
significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.” (quoting 
Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
Id. 
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B. Thin Copyright 
If the Star Athletica test remains unchanged by Congress, then the 
best solution is for courts to provide thinner copyright protection for a 
work of art as the separability analysis becomes more difficult (i.e., as it 
becomes more difficult to separate the work of art from the useful article). 
In general, thin copyright is a term that relates to the amount of copying 
of a certain work that will be actionable.151 Usually, when a court applies 
thin copyright protection, it provides lesser protection to a work seeking 
copyright protection because the work is made up of primarily 
unprotectable parts.152 The result of thin copyright protection is that it 
effects the infringement analysis by requiring a greater amount of 
similarity between the original and infringing works before the copying is 
considered improper appropriation.153 In essence, this means that the 
“thinner” the copyright protection that a court applies, the more “virtually 
identical” the infringing work must be to the copyrightable material.154 
Applying thin copyright protection makes a copyright infringement claim 
more difficult for the author of the original work, as less kinds of copying 
of the copyrighted material will be actionable. The aspects of thin 
copyright that can address the overprotection of works makes thin 
copyright the appropriate analytical tool to address the concerns that the 
new separability analysis leads to overprotection of functional elements of 
useful articles. 
Some commentators like Professor Levi have argued that applying 
limiting doctrines to the broad separability analysis— such as thin 
copyright—might be insufficient due to the overall anti-competitive 
impact of the aggregation of copyrights in the fashion industry.155 But the 
same motivations behind applying thin copyrights in other scenarios—to 
provide reduced protection to works that contain less copyrightable 
material—also apply to the new separability analysis.156 In addition to 
limiting overprotection by preventing useful articles from passing through 
both a low bar of separability and originality, the application of thin 
copyright protection is reasonable on its own terms. 
As previously mentioned, the decision to apply thin copyright 
protection is associated with the infringement component of a copyright 
infringement claim. In other words, this decision would occur once the 
 
151 See Balganesh, supra note 39, at 223. 
 152. Id.; see also JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 30–32 (2012). 
 153. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 412–14. 
 154. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the thin 
copyright doctrine provides protection only for copying that is “virtually identical”). 
 155. Levi, supra note 115, at 749. 
 156. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 209. 
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work of art incorporated into the useful article meets the new separability 
test and is copyrightable. Once an author shows that an infringer factually 
copied the protectable elements of the work,157 they must also show that 
the copying amounted to improper appropriation.158 A court will determine 
that copying constituted improper appropriation by looking at the 
similarity or substantial similarity between the two works,159 and there are 
various infringement tests that articulate when certain copying is 
improper.160 But there can also be an additional layer within this analysis; 
a court can vary the level of scrutiny it uses to compare the works and 
ultimately decide whether copying amounts to improper infringement.161 
This variation can be referred to as thickness and thinness: “The thicker 
the entitlement, the greater the forms and types of copying that are likely 
to be actionable; conversely, the thinner the entitlement, the fewer the 
forms and types of copying that are considered actionable.”162 
In the context of thin copyright and infringement, Feist Publications 
v. Rural Telephone Service Co. is the leading case and provides a good 
example.163 The Court in Feist used the words thin copyright to describe 
the point at which compilations of facts can obtain copyright protection.164 
While the facts themselves would not be copyrightable, arrangements of 
facts might have the minimal level of originality for those specific 
arrangements to be protected.165 The Court explained: 
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is 
thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler 
remains free to use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid 
in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does 
not feature the same . . . arrangement.166 
 
 157. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 407–12; Balganesh, supra note 39, at 207. 
 158. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 412. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 412–25 (4th ed. 2005) for 
the various tests for infringement, including the “virtual identity” test that will be discussed later in 
this section. 
 161. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 207. 
 162. Id. For more on the terminology of thin and thick copyright, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 859 
n.42, 884–87 (2004); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by 
Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Eric Setliff, 
Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 
77 (2006). 
 163. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 164. Terry S. Kogan, How Photographs Infringe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 398 (2017). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 349. 
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Professor Ginsburg explained that the amount of copyright 
protection afforded to works under the thin copyright doctrine is 
“[v]irtually none, short of extensive verbatim copying.”167 
A decision to apply thick or thin copyright protection turns on the 
extent to which the copyrighted work is in line with the overarching 
policies of copyright.168 Thus, works that serve “copyright’s primary 
purpose only marginally” receive only thin copyright protection.169 
Originality appears as a focal copyright policy involved in the decision to 
apply thin copyright protection, as it is often described as “the sine qua 
non of copyright.”170 While the amount of creativity needed for a work to 
be original is low,171 the creativity and authorship required for a work to 
be original are at the center of a significant copyright policy: to incentivize 
creativity.172 Thus, given that originality represents an important policy 
incentive in copyright, the choice of when to apply thin copyright 
protections sometimes turns on the level of creativity embodied in the 
work: “Many copyrights represent significant creative effort, and are 
therefore reasonably robust, whereas others reflect only scant creativity. 
The Supreme Court labels the latter ‘thin.’”173 
If a work of art is less creative, and therefore less original, it normally 
follows that the amount of the work that is copyrightable also decreases.174 
The lack of copyrightable material can trigger thin copyright protection 
because there is simply less of the work that can be protected.175 
Accordingly, a work that is made “primarily of unprotectable material” 
usually only gets thin copyright protection to ensure that protection is not 
haphazardly extended to other parts undeserving of protection.176 The 
underlying rationale of applying thin copyright to works composed of 
primarily unprotectable material demonstrates why thin copyright 
protection should generally be applied to useful articles. Useful articles 
will always be partly comprised of uncopyrightable material because their 
 
 167. Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information 
after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 349 (1992); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits 
Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the thin copyright doctrine provides protection 
only for copying that is “virtually identical”). 
 168. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 209. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; see also David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic: 
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 95 (2007). 
 171. Shipley, supra note 170, at 95. 
 172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 173. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][4] (2019) 
(footnote omitted). 
 174. See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 681 (2016). 
 175. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 173, § 13.03[A][4]. 
 176. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 223. 
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functional elements do not receive copyright protection.177 It follows that, 
while the work of art may possess a high level of creativity, it is still 
conveyed within a work containing many functional, uncopyrightable 
elements. The separability analysis is supposed to remove the 
copyrightable material from the uncopyrightable aspects of the useful 
article. But the separability analysis is now so easy to meet that it no longer 
can be depended upon to satisfactorily separate the copyrightable material 
(the work of art) from the uncopyrightable material (the utilitarian aspects 
of the useful article). The only bar is originality. Thus, in terms of the thin 
copyright’s policy considerations, courts should apply thin copyright 
protection to works of art incorporated into useful articles in the following 
way: the more difficult it is to separate the expressive part of the article 
from its unprotectable, functional elements, the thinner the copyright 
protection the court should apply in its final analysis.178 
  
 
 177. See Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic 
Markets, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 166 (2010); see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1002, 1009 (2017). 
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This “thin separability” approach would allow for flexibility. It 
would offer protection to designs incorporated into useful articles in cases 
like Mazer where Congress intended to extend copyright protection. But 
most importantly, such a test would offer a normative mechanism that 
courts can use to limit the overprotection of functional elements of useful 
articles after Star Athletica. The separability analysis no longer provides 
an appropriate limit to the overprotection of functional elements of useful 
articles. By restricting the amount of copying that will be improper, thin 
separability is a reasonable response to concerns that the new separability 
analysis leaves only originality as a limit to the overprotection of 
functional elements of useful articles. If a court decides to apply thin 
copyright, the original author will win in an infringement case only if the 
copier has copied the work of art in a way that creates a virtually identical 
copy of the original. At the same time, as a design becomes more clearly 
separable from the useful article, the test provides courts with the 
flexibility to require something less than virtually identical copying. Thin 
separability is the proper step for courts given the principles and policies 
of copyright if the legislature remains unwilling to act. 
CONCLUSION 
The new separability standard of Star Athletica is insufficient 
because it utilizes the abstract language of the statute. The cases surveyed 
in this Note give inklings as to the issues that courts will face in the future 
if the test remains unchanged. Issues exist both with how courts struggle 
to make sense of the standard and with the way the test is applied. 
Thin copyright protection could take pressure off of courts trying to 
limit and make sense of the new and broad separability. A petition to 
Congress to amend the statute is another viable option. If Congress 
decided to amend the statute, it could use the prior separability tests as the 
baseline for a new standard. While total clarity of separability seems like 
a lofty goal, this Note strives to provide the appropriate angles by which 
courts and lawmakers might think about solving the problem. 
